The U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), establishes the definitive Fourth Amendment standard for warrantless home entries during mental health welfare checks. For Tampa criminal defense attorneys and defendants throughout Florida, this ruling directly impacts suppression motions in cases where police entered homes without warrants to check on individuals reported as suicidal or in crisis. The Brancato Law Firm, P.A. analyzes how this decision affects criminal cases in Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Pasco Counties.

What Happened in Case v. Montana

The case began when William Case called his ex-girlfriend and told her he was going to kill himself. During the call, she heard what sounded like a gun being cocked, then a “pop,” followed by silence. She called 911, and police officers were dispatched to Case’s home for a welfare check.

When officers arrived, they knew Case had a history of mental health issues, alcohol abuse, and had previously attempted “suicide-by-cop.” They circled the house, knocked on doors, and yelled into an open window—but got no response. Through the windows, they could see empty beer cans, an empty handgun holster, and what appeared to be a suicide note. After approximately 40 minutes of deliberation and preparation, the officers entered the home without a warrant.

Case was hiding in a bedroom closet. When an officer approached, Case threw open the closet curtain while holding what appeared to be a gun. The officer, fearing for his life, shot Case. Consequently, Case was charged with assaulting a police officer and moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the warrantless entry.

The Supreme Court’s Holding: “Objectively Reasonable Basis”

The central question before the Court was what standard applies when police enter a home without a warrant to provide emergency aid. Three possible standards were at issue:

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kagan explained that the probable cause standard “is peculiarly related to criminal investigations” and would “fit awkwardly, if at all, in the non-criminal, non-investigatory setting” of emergency welfare checks. Therefore, the Court declined to “transplant” probable cause analysis to emergency aid situations.

At the same time, the Court made clear that Montana’s “reasonable suspicion” approach—requiring only “specific and articulable facts” from which an officer could “suspect” someone needs help—was also incorrect. That standard, borrowed from Terry v. Ohio street stops, is too low for the serious intrusion of entering someone’s home.

Justice Sotomayor’s Concurrence: Caution in Mental Health Crisis Responses

Justice Sotomayor joined the Court’s opinion but wrote separately to emphasize the “unique considerations” that apply when police respond to mental health crises. Her concurrence contains significant observations that defense attorneys should note:

Justice Sotomayor observed that “the presence of law enforcement at times can escalate the situation rather than ameliorate it.” Consequently, she suggested that in some circumstances, “it may be more reasonable for officers to try different means of de-escalation before entering the home”—such as speaking with the occupant from a distance, contacting family members, calling specialized crisis units, or working with mental health professionals.

Importantly, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that even when entry is justified, “the ‘manner’ of the officers’ entry and their subsequent conduct inside must also be ‘reasonable.'” This creates an additional avenue for suppression challenges based on how officers executed the entry, not just whether they were justified in entering at all.

What This Means for Tampa Criminal Cases

The Case v. Montana decision has immediate implications for criminal defense in Florida. Welfare check entries are common, and the evidence obtained often forms the basis for serious charges—from drug possession to weapons offenses to assault.

Grounds for Challenging Warrantless Welfare Check Entries

Based on Case v. Montana and its precedents, defense attorneys can challenge warrantless entries on several grounds:

• Insufficient basis for entry: Did officers have an “objectively reasonable basis” for believing someone was seriously injured or faced imminent harm? Vague reports or stale information may not suffice.
• Entry created the danger: As Case argued, if the primary risk arose from the officers’ entry itself (suicide-by-cop scenario), the entry may not have been justified to prevent harm.
• Unreasonable manner of entry: Per Justice Sotomayor, even a justified entry can become unconstitutional if officers act unreasonably once inside.
• Scope exceeded the emergency: The Court emphasized that emergency aid entries provide “no basis to search the premises beyond what is reasonably needed to deal with the emergency.”
• Alternative de-escalation ignored: Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence suggests officers should consider alternatives before entry—failure to do so may undermine reasonableness.

Why Police Training Standards Matter in These Cases

From the Courtroom: “As a former police academy instructor in criminal procedure and courtroom testimony, I taught officers the constitutional requirements they must follow—including when they can and cannot enter a home without a warrant. When I cross-examine an officer about a welfare check entry, I’m not guessing what training they received on Fourth Amendment standards. I delivered that training. I know what they were taught about the emergency aid exception, and I know when their actions deviate from proper constitutional standards.” — Rocky Brancato

The Case v. Montana decision clarifies the legal standard, but officers still must apply it correctly in the field. Furthermore, as Justice Sotomayor noted, officers responding to mental health crises should consider de-escalation alternatives. When officers rush to enter without adequate basis or without considering alternatives, the resulting evidence may be subject to suppression.

Key Precedents on Emergency Aid Home Entries

The Court’s decision in Case v. Montana builds on established Fourth Amendment precedent. Understanding these cases helps identify when suppression challenges may succeed:

• Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006): Established the “objectively reasonable basis for believing” standard for emergency aid entries. Officers witnessed a fight through a window with someone being struck and bleeding.
• Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009): Applied Brigham City where officers found broken windows, blood on doors, and a man screaming and throwing things inside.
• Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021): Rejected a broad “community caretaking” exception for home entries. Officers must have a specific emergency—general welfare concerns are insufficient.

Circuit Split Resolved by Case v. Montana

For Florida practitioners, the Eleventh Circuit had previously required probable cause for emergency aid entries. That position is now overruled. However, this doesn’t mean all welfare check entries are automatically valid—the “objectively reasonable basis” standard still demands meaningful factual support, and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence provides additional arguments for challenging entries in mental health crisis situations.

Frequently Asked Questions About Warrantless Welfare Check Entries

Questions About the Legal Standard

Questions About Challenging Evidence

Questions About Mental Health Crisis Responses

Protect Your Rights — Challenge Unlawful Entries

If you’ve been charged with a crime based on evidence discovered during a welfare check or emergency entry, your Fourth Amendment rights may have been violated. The Case v. Montana decision clarifies the standard—but officers don’t always meet it. An experienced criminal defense attorney can analyze whether the entry was constitutionally justified and whether the evidence should be suppressed.

Contact Tampa Criminal Defense Attorney Rocky Brancato Today

Call (813) 727-7159 for a Confidential Consultation

The Brancato Law Firm, P.A.

620 E. Twiggs Street, Suite 205, Tampa, FL 33602

Serving Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Pasco Counties

25+ Years of Criminal Defense Experience | Former Chief Operations Officer, Hillsborough County Public Defender’s Office | Former Police Academy Instructor in Criminal Procedure

Related: Learn More About Search and Seizure Defense

• Top 10 Criminal Defense Strategies in Tampa
• Understanding Motions to Suppress in Florida Criminal Cases
• Tampa Police Mistakes Can Lead to Dismissal
• Outstanding Warrant in Tampa? Here’s What to Do Now

Updated January 2026 with Cherfils v. State

A Turning Point in Florida Search and Seizure Law

On October 1, 2025, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal issued an en banc opinion in Williams v. State, No. 2D2023-2200 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 1, 2025), that marks a turning point in Florida search and seizure law. The court held that the odor of cannabis, by itself, is no longer enough to establish probable cause for a search.

This ruling aligns Florida law with modern statutory changes surrounding cannabis—including medical marijuana legalization and hemp decriminalization—and underscores the need for defense attorneys to challenge searches based solely on smell.

However, on December 31, 2025, the Second DCA issued Cherfils v. State, No. 2D2023-1932, which provides critical guidance on what additional factors—combined with odor—will still justify a vehicle search. Understanding both cases is essential for anyone facing cannabis-related charges in Florida.

The Cherfils Case: When Odor Plus Other Factors Equals Probable Cause

Just three months after Williams, the Second DCA issued Cherfils v. State, which affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress despite the court’s new limitations on plain smell searches. Understanding why the search was upheld in Cherfils is critical for anyone stopped by police who claims to smell cannabis.

What Happened in Cherfils

Joshua Cherfils was stopped at night for an improperly illuminated license tag in a high-crime area. As the officer approached, he smelled burnt marijuana. When asked for his license, Cherfils became argumentative and appeared nervous. After the officer mentioned the marijuana odor, Cherfils produced his medical marijuana card and stated he had smoked marijuana earlier in the day. The officer testified that the smell was “a lot more than just if someone smoked earlier.”

The officer searched the vehicle and found cocaine in a cigarette box, fresh marijuana in a clear bag on the center console, and several burnt marijuana cigarettes in an ashtray.

Why the Court Upheld the Search

The Second DCA acknowledged that under Williams, “plain smell no longer establishes probable cause.” However, the court found that the totality of the circumstances supported probable cause. The officer was not relying on smell alone—multiple additional factors supported a reasonable belief that criminal activity was occurring.

Factors That Supported Probable Cause in Cherfils

Background: The Williams Case That Changed the Law

Darrielle Ortiz Williams was on probation after serving a lengthy prison term. During a 2023 traffic stop in Hillsborough County, officers claimed they smelled cannabis when approaching the vehicle. Relying solely on this odor, they searched the car and found substances that led to his arrest.

Williams moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the plain smell doctrine should no longer apply given Florida’s medical marijuana laws and hemp legalization. The trial court denied his motion, citing older precedent that allowed searches based on marijuana odor alone.

On appeal, the Second DCA took the opportunity to revisit the doctrine—sitting en banc to reconsider its own prior ruling in Owens v. State (2021). Importantly, in Williams there were no additional facts suggesting criminal activity: no admission of use, no indication the cannabis was medical marijuana versus hemp, no evidence of recent smoking in the vehicle, and conflicting officer testimony about whether the cannabis was fresh or burnt.

Why the Evidence Was Still Admitted in Williams

Although the Second DCA receded from its earlier ruling in Owens v. State (2021), it ultimately affirmed Williams’ probation revocation. The reason: at the time of the search, Owens was binding precedent.

Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. United States, evidence is not excluded when officers reasonably rely on then-controlling appellate precedent. Because the officers acted in good faith based on the law as it existed at the time, the exclusionary rule did not apply.

Certified Question to the Florida Supreme Court

Recognizing the sweeping impact of its holding, the Second DCA certified a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court:

This certified question sets the stage for the Florida Supreme Court to provide definitive statewide guidance on the issue. Until then, the Williams ruling is binding in the Second DCA’s jurisdiction—which includes Hillsborough, Pinellas, Pasco, Manatee, Sarasota, and DeSoto Counties. The Brancato Law Firm serves clients in Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Pasco Counties, where these rulings directly apply.

Before and After Williams: What Changed

Practical Impact for Florida Drivers

For years, drivers across Florida have been searched, arrested, and prosecuted after an officer claimed to smell marijuana. Williams and Cherfils together provide a new framework:

Odor alone is no longer enough. Officers must point to other facts beyond smell to justify a search—such as visible contraband, erratic driving, statements by the driver, or other indicators of criminal activity.

But your statements can provide those additional facts. In Cherfils, the driver’s production of a medical marijuana card and admission of smoking earlier gave the officer the additional factors needed for probable cause.

Medical marijuana patients face unique risks. Because it is illegal to smoke medical marijuana in a vehicle, identifying yourself as a cardholder when an officer smells cannabis can establish probable cause where none existed before.

Suppression motions challenging odor-based searches should now be filed in cases arising after October 1, 2025—but attorneys must carefully analyze whether Cherfils-type factors apply.

What Officers Must Now Show for Probable Cause

Frequently Asked Questions: Plain Smell Doctrine in Florida

620 E. Twiggs Street, Suite 205, Tampa, FL 33602

Related:

• Tampa Drug Crimes Lawyer – Defense for drug possession and trafficking
• Marijuana DUI Charges in Florida – What You Need to Know
• Florida Medical Marijuana Transportation Laws
• Tampa Criminal Defense Attorney – Full-service criminal defense

Moschella v. State, No. 2D2023-0044 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 9, 2025)

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal recently issued a decision that reinforces a fundamental protection in criminal law: search warrants have expiration dates, and when police miss them, the evidence goes away. In Moschella v. State, the court reversed a child pornography conviction because law enforcement waited too long to execute the warrant—and no amount of “good reasons” could save the State’s case. An Experienced Tampa Sex Crimes Attorney may be able to help in your search warrant case too.

What Happened in This Case

James T. Moschella entered a no contest plea to possession of child pornography but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The State agreed that if Moschella won the suppression issue on appeal, the charges would be dismissed.

The central issue involved a search warrant authorizing forensic examination of Moschella’s electronic devices—mobile phones, a tablet, and a laptop. The warrant issued on July 27, 2020. However, law enforcement didn’t execute it until sometime in September—well beyond the 10-day execution window required by Florida law.

Florida’s 10-Day Search Warrant Rule

Under Florida Statute §933.05, a search warrant must be returned within ten days of issuance. This rule has existed for over a century, reflecting the legislature’s clear intent to protect citizens’ privacy rights by limiting how long a warrant remains valid.

Florida courts have consistently held that a warrant executed beyond this 10-day period becomes “stale,” and any search conducted under it is invalid. The Second DCA established this principle in Spera v. State, 467 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), making clear that the 10-day requirement is firm and doesn’t depend on whether the defendant suffered actual prejudice from the delay.

Key Legal Points from Moschella

Why the Trial Court Got It Wrong

The trial court denied Moschella’s suppression motion by finding he wasn’t “prejudiced” by the delay. In other words, the trial judge reasoned that since the evidence would have been the same whether police searched on day 8 or day 45, Moschella couldn’t complain.

The Second DCA rejected this reasoning. Citing Spera, the appellate court explained that courts cannot graft a “prejudice” requirement onto the statute’s straightforward language. The legislature—not judges—determined that 10 days is reasonable for warrant execution. When police exceed that deadline, the warrant becomes invalid regardless of circumstances.

Because the State had stipulated that suppression would be dispositive, the Second DCA reversed Moschella’s judgment and sentence and remanded with instructions to dismiss the charges.

What This Means for Criminal Defendants

Moschella reinforces several critical principles that apply to any Florida criminal case involving search warrants:

1. Strict Compliance Matters: Law enforcement must execute search warrants within 10 days. Missing this deadline—even by a few days—can invalidate all evidence obtained.
2. Prejudice Is Irrelevant: Defendants don’t have to prove the delay harmed them. The expired warrant alone is enough to suppress the evidence.
3. Dispositive Stipulations Are Binding: When prosecutors agree that suppression ends the case, a successful appeal results in dismissal—not a new trial.
4. Technical Defenses Win Cases: Procedural violations by law enforcement—timing, documentation, chain of custody—can be just as effective as challenging the evidence itself.

Why This Matters in Digital Evidence Cases

Cases involving electronic devices—child pornography, internet crimes, fraud—often depend entirely on digital evidence seized under warrant. These searches require forensic examination, which takes time. Law enforcement sometimes delays execution because devices need to be shipped to specialized labs, or forensic examiners have backlogs.

But Moschella makes clear that these practical difficulties don’t excuse missing the 10-day deadline. If police need more time, they must seek a new warrant—not simply ignore the expiration of the existing one.

For defendants facing serious charges based on seized computers, phones, or storage devices, this case demonstrates why meticulous review of warrant execution dates is essential. An attorney who overlooks this issue leaves a potentially case-ending defense on the table.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Florida’s 10-day search warrant rule?

Under Florida Statute §933.05, law enforcement must execute and return a search warrant within 10 days of issuance. A warrant executed after this deadline is considered “stale” and invalid, meaning evidence obtained from the search must be suppressed.

Do I have to prove the late warrant execution hurt my case?

No. Florida courts have consistently held that no showing of prejudice is required. The mere fact that the warrant was executed beyond the 10-day deadline is enough to invalidate the search, regardless of what evidence was found.

What happens if evidence is suppressed in my case?

If suppressed evidence is central to the State’s case—as it was in Moschella—the charges may be dismissed entirely. In other cases, suppression may weaken the prosecution’s case enough to result in reduced charges or acquittal at trial.

How do I know if my warrant was executed late?

The warrant itself shows the issuance date, and the return shows when it was executed. An experienced criminal defense attorney reviews these documents carefully as part of standard case evaluation. Many defendants don’t realize this issue exists until their attorney identifies it.

Facing Digital Evidence Charges in Tampa?

Your freedom may depend on holding the government to its constitutional and statutory obligations. Cases like Moschella don’t happen by accident—they happen because defense attorneys scrutinize every detail of how evidence was obtained.

I’m Rocky Brancato. For over 25 years, I have defended clients facing serious criminal charges throughout Tampa Bay, including cases involving digital evidence and constitutional violations. If you’re facing charges based on seized electronic devices, I can review your case for warrant timing issues, chain of custody problems, and other procedural violations that could result in suppression or dismissal.

Call (813) 727-7159 for a Confidential Consultation

The Brancato Law Firm, P.A.

620 E. Twiggs Street, Suite 205, Tampa, FL 33602

Serving Hillsborough, Pinellas, Pasco, and Polk Counties

Case Citation: Moschella v. State, No. 2D2023-0044 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 9, 2025). See also Spera v. State, 467 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).