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                <title><![CDATA[Can Police Track Your Phone Without a Warrant in Florida?]]></title>
                <link>https://www.brancatolawfirm.com/blog/chatrie-supreme-court-cell-phone-location-data-fourth-amendment/</link>
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                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Brancato Law Firm, P.A.]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 01:34:47 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Criminal Defense]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Fourth Amendment]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[United States Supreme Court]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Warrants]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Cell Tower]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Cellular Phones]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Fourth Amendment]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Geofence]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[geofence warrant]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Location Data]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[United States Supreme Court]]></category>
                
                
                
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                <description><![CDATA[<p>Rewrite/update date: September 2, 2026 No — not anymore, for the location history your phone quietly logs. In Chatrie v. United States (June 29, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that police conduct a Fourth Amendment search when they obtain your cell-phone location data — even just two hours of it, and even though a&hellip;</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Rewrite/update date: September 2, 2026</em></p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table>

<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No — not anymore, for the location history your phone quietly logs.
In <em>Chatrie v. United States</em> (June 29, 2026), the U.S. Supreme
Court held that police conduct a Fourth Amendment search when they
obtain your cell-phone location data — even just two hours of it, and
even though a company like Google stores it. That means a valid warrant
is generally required, and a defective one can be challenged with a
motion to suppress. The Court did not decide whether the warrant in
Chatrie’s own case was valid or whether the evidence gets thrown out —
those questions were sent back down, and they are exactly where the
defense fight now lives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I’m Rocky Brancato, founder of The Brancato Law Firm, P.A., a <a href="https://www.brancatolawfirm.com/">Tampa criminal defense</a> firm.
As a former police academy legal instructor, I taught officers what the
Fourth Amendment lets them do — and where the line sits. Our attorneys
use that same line every week in suppression litigation, and
<em>Chatrie</em> just redrew it for every criminal case in Florida built
on cell-phone location data.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What Did the Supreme Court Decide in Chatrie v. United States?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Supreme Court held that when police obtained a suspect’s Google
“Location History” through a geofence warrant, they conducted a Fourth
Amendment search — because people keep a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cell-phone location data. <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-112_0am4.pdf"><em>Chatrie v. United States</em>, No. 25-112 (U.S. June 29, 2026)</a>, extends the Court’s
landmark 2018 decision in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf"><em>Carpenter v. United States</em></a> (which
protected cell-site location records) to the far more precise location
logs generated by smartphone apps.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="683" height="1024" src="/static/2026/06/do-police-need-warrant-cell-phone-location-data-florida-683x1024.jpg" alt="After Chatrie v. United States (2026), police need a warrant for cell-phone location data: it is a Fourth Amendment search, two hours counts, the third-party doctrine does not apply, and it applies in Florida. Brancato Law, Tampa." class="wp-image-4451" style="width:503px;height:auto" srcset="/static/2026/06/do-police-need-warrant-cell-phone-location-data-florida-683x1024.jpg 683w, /static/2026/06/do-police-need-warrant-cell-phone-location-data-florida-200x300.jpg 200w, /static/2026/06/do-police-need-warrant-cell-phone-location-data-florida-768x1152.jpg 768w, /static/2026/06/do-police-need-warrant-cell-phone-location-data-florida.jpg 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 683px) 100vw, 683px" /></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Three points from the decision matter most for anyone facing charges.
First, duration doesn’t save the government: the Court rejected the
argument that a “short” window — the two hours pulled in Chatrie’s case
— is too little to trigger the Fourth Amendment, explaining that even
brief location records can reveal deeply private facts. Second, storage
by a third party doesn’t matter: the Court held the “third-party
doctrine” does not apply, because location data is “not truly shared” in
any meaningful sense — it is simply the automatic price of using a
modern phone. Third, the Court decided only that a search occurred. It
vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and sent the case back to decide
whether the warrant satisfied probable cause and particularity, and
whether the good-faith exception saves the evidence if it did not.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="683" height="1024" src="/static/2026/06/chatrie-what-supreme-court-did-not-decide-683x1024.jpg" alt="What Chatrie v. United States (2026) did not decide: whether the geofence warrant was valid, whether evidence is suppressed, and whether the good-faith exception applies — all remanded to the Fourth Circuit. Brancato Law, Tampa." class="wp-image-4452" style="aspect-ratio:0.6670104865050713;width:491px;height:auto" srcset="/static/2026/06/chatrie-what-supreme-court-did-not-decide-683x1024.jpg 683w, /static/2026/06/chatrie-what-supreme-court-did-not-decide-200x300.jpg 200w, /static/2026/06/chatrie-what-supreme-court-did-not-decide-768x1152.jpg 768w, /static/2026/06/chatrie-what-supreme-court-did-not-decide.jpg 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 683px) 100vw, 683px" /></figure>
</div>


<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What Was the Chatrie Case About?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The case began with a bank robbery that stumped investigators. On May
20, 2019, a man robbed a credit union in Midlothian, Virginia; witnesses
and surveillance showed him approaching from the corner of a neighboring
church while appearing to talk on a cell phone, but the trail went cold.
Police then obtained a geofence warrant directing Google to identify
devices with Location History enabled near the credit union around the
robbery. That process ultimately pointed to Okello Chatrie, whose phone
data placed him at the scene — two hours of his movements, pulled from
Google’s servers. He moved to suppress, lost on good-faith grounds in
the lower courts, and the Supreme Court took the case to answer the
threshold question: was this a “search” at all? Six Justices said
yes.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What Is a Geofence Warrant — and Can Google Still Answer One?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A geofence warrant works in reverse: instead of naming a suspect and
searching their data, police draw a virtual perimeter around a crime
scene and ask a company — most famously Google — to identify every
device inside it during a time window. The process in <em>Chatrie</em>
ran in steps: first an anonymized list of devices in the zone, then
expanded data to narrow the list, then the “unmasking” of specific
accounts — names, emails, phone numbers. Justice Jackson’s concurrence
flagged the core defect defense lawyers now argue: the later steps often
happen with no criteria and no judge supervising which devices get
unmasked, leaving “too much to the discretion” of the officers.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-full is-resized"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="825" height="1024" src="/static/2026/06/how-a-geofence-warrant-works-explained.jpg" alt="Infographic explaining how a geofence warrant works: police draw a virtual circle around a crime scene, get anonymous device data, narrow the list, then unmask the users. Brancato Law, Tampa criminal defense." class="wp-image-4459" style="aspect-ratio:0.8056815416270271;width:525px;height:auto" srcset="/static/2026/06/how-a-geofence-warrant-works-explained.jpg 825w, /static/2026/06/how-a-geofence-warrant-works-explained-242x300.jpg 242w, /static/2026/06/how-a-geofence-warrant-works-explained-768x953.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 825px) 100vw, 825px" /></figure>
</div>


<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Geofence Surveillance, By the Numbers</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The scale of this surveillance tool is why the decision matters far
beyond one Virginia robbery — the numbers below come from the opinion
itself.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table>

<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>What the Supreme Court’s opinion says</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 → 982 → 11,000+</td>
<td>Geofence warrants Google received in 2016, 2018, and 2020 — from a
single request to more than eleven thousand in four years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 million+</td>
<td>Users worldwide who have enabled Google Location History after the
company’s repeated prompts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every 2 minutes</td>
<td>How often Location History logs a phone’s position — roughly 720
chartings every day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within 20 meters</td>
<td>The precision of those logs, which can even estimate elevation and
reveal which floor of a building a phone is on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table></figure>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="683" height="1024" src="/static/2026/06/geofence-surveillance-by-the-numbers-chatrie-683x1024.jpg" alt="Statistics from Chatrie v. United States (2026): geofence warrants to Google grew from 1 in 2016 to over 11,000 in 2020; 500 million-plus Location History users; phones logged every two minutes within 20 meters. Brancato Law, Tampa." class="wp-image-4453" style="width:503px;height:auto" srcset="/static/2026/06/geofence-surveillance-by-the-numbers-chatrie-683x1024.jpg 683w, /static/2026/06/geofence-surveillance-by-the-numbers-chatrie-200x300.jpg 200w, /static/2026/06/geofence-surveillance-by-the-numbers-chatrie-768x1152.jpg 768w, /static/2026/06/geofence-surveillance-by-the-numbers-chatrie.jpg 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 683px) 100vw, 683px" /></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two details from the opinion deserve emphasis. Location History runs
constantly in the background once enabled — whether or not the app is
open, whether or not the phone is in use — and it keeps running even if
the user deletes the app that turned it on. And Android users are
specifically warned their devices will not “work correctly” unless they
turn it on. The Court treated that reality for what it is: tracking as a
default condition of modern life, not a voluntary broadcast of your
whereabouts.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Is My Cell-Phone Location Data Protected by the Fourth
Amendment?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yes — after <em>Chatrie</em>, your historical location data is
constitutionally protected whether it comes from cell towers or from
app-based logs, and regardless of how short the time window is. The
decision closes the two arguments the government had been using to avoid
<em>Carpenter</em>.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table>

<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument the government made</th>
<th>What the Court held</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Only two hours of data — too short to be a search”</td>
<td>Rejected. Even short-term location records can reveal familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. There is no
“Constitution-free zone” measured in hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“You shared it with Google, so the third-party doctrine
applies”</td>
<td>Rejected. Location History is “not truly shared” — generating it is
the automatic price of using a phone, and users reasonably understand
the record as their own.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Users opt in, unlike cell-site records”</td>
<td>Rejected as a distinction. Google repeatedly prompts users to enable
it, and over 500 million have — the Court refused to treat that as a
knowing surrender of privacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The warrant here was valid, so it doesn’t matter”</td>
<td>Not decided. Warrant validity and the good-faith exception went back
to the Fourth Circuit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The undecided fourth row is not a footnote — it is the battleground.
A ruling that a search occurred means nothing in a specific case until a
court examines whether the warrant (if there was one) was supported by
probable cause and described the search with particularity. That
examination is defense work, done case by case, device by device.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">How Did the Justices Vote in Chatrie?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson — with Justice
Gorsuch concurring in the judgment, making six votes for the outcome.
Justice Jackson added a concurrence (joined by Justice Sotomayor)
arguing the multi-step geofence process gave officers an unsupervised
“roving commission.” Justice Gorsuch would have reached the result on
different reasoning. Justice Alito dissented — warning the decision
“will send seismic waves through our Fourth Amendment doctrine” — joined
in part by Justices Thomas and Barrett, and Justice Barrett filed her
own dissent.</p>


<div class="wp-block-image">
<figure class="aligncenter size-large is-resized"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="777" height="1024" src="/static/2026/06/chatrie-how-the-justices-lined-up-2026-777x1024.jpg" alt="How the Justices voted in Chatrie v. United States (2026): a six-Justice majority and concurrence held that obtaining cell-phone location data is a Fourth Amendment search; Alito, Thomas, and Barrett dissented. Brancato Law, Tampa." class="wp-image-4456" style="width:551px;height:auto" srcset="/static/2026/06/chatrie-how-the-justices-lined-up-2026-777x1024.jpg 777w, /static/2026/06/chatrie-how-the-justices-lined-up-2026-228x300.jpg 228w, /static/2026/06/chatrie-how-the-justices-lined-up-2026-768x1013.jpg 768w, /static/2026/06/chatrie-how-the-justices-lined-up-2026.jpg 1092w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 777px) 100vw, 777px" /></figure>
</div>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The lineup matters for what comes next: the majority’s reasoning was
joined by five Justices, the case produced four separate opinions, and
the open questions — warrant validity, good faith, other kinds of
digital records — will be litigated against that backdrop for years.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Does Chatrie Apply to Criminal Cases in Florida?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yes — immediately and automatically. Florida’s own constitution, <a href="https://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?submenu=3">Article
I, Section 12</a>, commands that Florida’s search-and-seizure right
“shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.”
So <em>Chatrie</em> is not persuasive authority here; it is the
governing rule in every Florida courtroom, from the 13th Judicial
Circuit in Tampa outward.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Florida law enforcement already works with location technology under
state statutes like <a href="https://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0900-0999/0934/Sections/0934.42.html">Fla.
Stat. § 934.42</a>, which lets officers get court orders for mobile
tracking devices — and which expressly makes U.S. Supreme Court
standards govern their installation and monitoring. After
<em>Chatrie</em>, those standards now clearly include a warrant
requirement for historical app-based location data. In practice, our
attorneys look for location evidence in Tampa Bay cases in three
familiar places: geofence-style requests tied to a crime scene,
account-specific demands for a suspect’s Google or Apple data, and
downloads from a seized phone itself. Each source now has its own
constitutional checklist, and a defect in any of them supports a motion
to suppress.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What Comes Next — Are Reverse Keyword Warrants Legal?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Chatrie</em> answered the geofence question but teed up the next
fight: reverse keyword warrants, where police ask a search engine to
identify everyone who searched a particular term — a victim’s name, an
address, a chemical — during a window of time. The logic of
<em>Chatrie</em> (a dragnet over mostly innocent people’s private data,
revealed only because using the internet is the price of modern life)
applies with obvious force, but the Supreme Court has not yet decided
it, and lower courts are split on how far <em>Carpenter</em> and now
<em>Chatrie</em> reach. The same goes for other data dragnets: tower
dumps, automated license-plate reader networks, and purchases of
location data from commercial brokers. Currency matters in this area
more than almost any other — the constitutional rules your case is
judged by may literally change between arrest and trial, which is why
preserving these issues early is essential.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What Should You Do If Police Used Phone Location Data in Your
Case?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Get the warrant paperwork in front of a defense lawyer before you
make any decisions about your case. After <em>Chatrie</em>, the
questions our attorneys ask are concrete: Was there a warrant at all, or
just a subpoena or “exigent” request? Does the affidavit establish
probable cause tied to the place and time searched? Did the warrant
limit the geofence’s size, duration, and the unmasking steps — or did
officers get a blank check? Was your data pulled at step one or only
after unsupervised narrowing? Every one of those defects is a
suppression argument, and in a case built on placing your phone at a
scene, suppression is usually the whole case. Location-data challenges
also travel with the rest of the digital-privacy toolbox — see our
guides to <a href="https://www.brancatolawfirm.com/blog/can-the-state-get-your-medical-records-florida-dui/">whether
the State can get your medical records in a DUI case</a> and <a href="https://www.brancatolawfirm.com/blog/what-to-do-after-being-arrested-in-tampa-florida/">what
to do after being arrested in Tampa</a>. And because these motions are
won on timing — witnesses’ memories, preservation letters to Google,
litigation before the State’s filing decision — the sooner the defense
starts, the more options you have.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For more about our defense strategies, visit our <a href="https://www.brancatolawfirm.com/hillsborough-county-criminal-defense-attorney/">Hillsborough
County criminal defense</a> page.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Frequently Asked Questions</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Do police need a warrant to get my Google location history?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yes. After <em>Chatrie v. United States</em> (2026), obtaining your
historical cell-phone location data — including Google Location History
— is a Fourth Amendment search, so police generally need a valid warrant
supported by probable cause. Our attorneys examine whether the warrant
in your case actually meets those requirements, because “a warrant
existed” is not the same as “the warrant was valid.”</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Can police still use geofence warrants after Chatrie?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Geofence warrants were not banned — the Court held only that they are
searches, which means they require valid warrants. Whether any
particular geofence warrant satisfies probable cause and particularity
is now the contested question, and Justice Jackson’s concurrence gives
the defense a roadmap for attacking the unmasking steps. We raise those
challenges by motion to suppress in Florida courts.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Does Chatrie apply if police only got a couple hours of my location
data?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yes — that was precisely the government’s argument, and the Court
rejected it. Two hours of Location History was enough to trigger the
Fourth Amendment because even short windows reveal private associations.
There is no minimum number of hours before your rights apply.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Will the evidence in my case be thrown out automatically?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">No. <em>Chatrie</em> decided that a search occurred; whether evidence
is suppressed depends on whether the warrant was valid and whether the
good-faith exception applies — the questions remanded in Chatrie’s own
case. That is exactly the analysis The Brancato Law Firm, P.A. performs
when location data appears in discovery, because the suppression fight
is where these cases are won or lost.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">How do I know if a geofence warrant was used in my case?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">You usually learn it from discovery — search warrant returns,
affidavits, or references to Google legal process in reports. Defense
counsel can demand the full warrant package, the data Google produced at
each step, and the communications around it. If you were arrested in
Hillsborough, Pinellas, or Pasco County and phone location evidence is
involved, The Brancato Law Firm, P.A. can obtain and audit that
paperwork.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Does turning off Location History protect me?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Turning it off stops Google’s Location History logging going forward,
but other apps, your carrier’s cell-site records, and data brokers still
generate location trails — each with its own legal protections.
<em>Chatrie</em> and <em>Carpenter</em> now protect the two biggest
categories. The safest assumption is that your phone creates records
someone may one day try to use, and the Constitution now stands between
those records and warrantless access.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity" />



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Chatrie</em> redrew the digital-privacy map on June 29, 2026, and
the next rounds — warrant validity, good faith, keyword warrants — are
being litigated right now. If cell-phone location data shows up anywhere
in your Tampa Bay case, call the attorneys of The Brancato Law Firm,
P.A. — founded by Tampa Criminal Defense Attorney Rocky Brancato — at
(813) 727-7159 before the State’s filing decision is made. Suppression
issues are strongest when they are raised early, and location-data
challenges are the sharpest new tool in the box.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Brancato Law Firm, P.A.<br />
620 E. Twiggs Street, Suite 205, Tampa, FL 33602<br />
(813) 727-7159<br />
Serving Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Pasco Counties</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Brancato Law Firm, P.A. is a Tampa-based criminal defense
practice. We are not affiliated with any other Brancato-named law
firms.</p>

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